Trade, Multinational Production, and the Gains from Openness by Natalia Ramondo & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We benefited from comments by participants at various conferences and seminars. We have also benefited
from comments and suggestions from Costas Arkolakis, Russell Cooper, Ana Cecilia Fieler, Chad
Jones, Pete Klenow, David Lagakos, Alexander Monge-Naranjo, Ellen McGrattan, Nancy Stokey,
Joris Pinkse, Jim Tybout, and Stephen Yeaple. We are particularly grateful to Sam Kortum and Jonathan
Eaton for help with several data and technical questions that emerged during this research. We thank
Alex Tarasov for his excellent research assistance. Andrés Rodríguez-Clare thanks the Human Capital
Foundation (http://www.hcfoundation.ru) for support. All errors are our own. The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Natalia Ramondo and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Trade, Multinational Production, and the Gains from Openness
Natalia Ramondo and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
NBER Working Paper No. 15604
December 2009, Revised January 2010
JEL No. F1,F10,F23,F43
ABSTRACT
Much attention has been devoted to the quantification of the gains from trade. In this paper our goal
is to quantify the gains from openness, which includes trade as well as other ways in which countries
interact. We focus on trade and multinational production (MP), which in 2007 was almost twice as
large as trade flows. We present and calibrate a model where countries interact through trade as well
as MP, and then quantify the overall gains from openness and the role of both of these channels in
generating those gains. The model captures several dimensions of the complex interaction between
trade and MP: trade and MP are competing ways to serve a foreign market; MP relies on imports of
intermediate goods from the home country; and trade and MP are intimately linked when multinationals'
foreign affiliates export part of their output. The calibrated model implies that while the gains from
trade are around twice the gains calculated in trade-only models, the gains from MP are a bit lower
than those calculated in MP-only models.
Natalia Ramondo
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There is an extensive literature on the gains that countries derive from interacting with each
other. The attention has focused on quantifying the gains from single mechanisms in isolation,
especially trade in goods (e.g., Eaton and Kortum) and to a lesser extent Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) or multinational production (MP) (e.g., Ramondo, 2008, McGrattan and Prescott,
2009).1 Much less attention has been given to the quantitative implications of the interaction
between trade and MP. In this paper we construct and calibrate a general equilibrium model to
evaluate the gains from openness to trade and to MP. Because of the rich interactions between
trade and MP in our model, we ﬁnd higher gains from trade than in existing models with only
trade, while our computed gains from MP are slightly lower than those in models with only
MP.
We build on the Ricardian model of international trade developed by Eaton and Kortum
(2002). Our main innovation is to incorporate MP into the model by allowing a country’s
technologies to be used for production abroad. The model has tradable intermediate goods
and non-tradable consumption goods, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). For non-tradable goods,
serving a foreign market can only be done through MP, but for tradable goods we have to
consider the choice between exports and MP.2 Trade ﬂows are a ected by iceberg-type costs
that may vary across country pairs. To avoid these costs, or to beneﬁt from lower costs abroad,
ﬁrms producing tradable goods may prefer to serve a foreign market through MP rather than
exports. We assume that MP entails some e ciency losses that may vary across country pairs.
Further, we allow for the possibility that multinationals’ foreign a liates rely, at least partially,
on imported inputs from their home country; in our empirical approach, we think of this as
“intra-ﬁrm” trade.3 Our set-up also allows ﬁrms to use a third country as a “bridge”, or export
platform, to serve a particular market; we refer to this as bridge MP (or simply BMP). For
1Multinational production measures the sales of foreign a liates of multinational ﬁrms. This is arguably at
least as important as trade: for example, in 2007 total worldwide MP was almost twice as high as total world
exports (UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, 2009).
2A signiﬁcant part of MP ﬂows is in non-tradable goods. Around 50% of the value of production by US a l-
iates of foreign multinationals is in sectors other than manufacturing, agriculture and mining (own calculations
from Bureau of Economic Analysis). Additionally, according to the UNCTAD (2009), in 2007, Foreign Direct
Investment stocks in the service sector represented more than 60% of the total stock in developed countries.
3The empirical evidence points to signiﬁcant intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows related to multinational activities (Han-
son, Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2003; Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2005; and Alfaro and Charlton, 2007).
According to our own calculations using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, “intra-ﬁrm” imports from
their headquarters represent more than 7.5% of total gross production done by foreign a liates of American
multinationals.
1example, a ﬁrm from country i producing a tradable good can serve country n by doing MP in
country l, and shipping it to country n. This entails MP costs associated with the pair {i,l},
and also trade costs associated with the pair {l,n}.4
Our model captures several dimensions of the complex interaction between trade and MP.
First, as in models of “horizontal” FDI such as Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard
(1993), Markusen and Venables (2000), and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), trade and MP
are competing ways to serve a foreign market.5 This implies that an increase in trade costs
generates smaller welfare losses as MP partially replaces the decline in trade. Second, as in the
models of “vertical” FDI, like in Helpman (1984, 1985), and more recently Keller and Yeaple
(2009), the reliance by foreign a liates on imports of home-country inputs implies that MP
boosts trade and trade facilitates MP.6 This complementarity between trade and MP implies
that an increase in trade costs leads to larger welfare losses through an indirect negative impact
on MP. Finally, complementarity between trade and MP also arises in our model due to the
presence of BMP: since BMP ﬂows entail both trade and MP ﬂows, an increase in trade costs
decreases MP associated with BMP and generates larger losses.
The existence of these forces of substitutability and complementarity between trade and MP
implies that models with only trade and models with only MP may generate biased estimates
of the gains from trade and MP.7 If complementarity forces dominate, for example, the gains
from trade calculated in trade-only models will be lower than those in our model, which takes
appropriate account of such forces by calculating the gains from trade as the increase in real
income as we move from a situation with only MP to the actual equilibrium with both trade
and MP. Similarly, the gains from MP calculated in MP-only models may be biased as well.8 An
4Foreign subsidiaries of multinationals often sell a sizable part of their output outside of the host country of
production: around 30% of total sales of US a liates in Europe are made outside the host country of production
(Blonigen, 2005).
5Studies using ﬁrm-level data ﬁnd evidence of such substitutability between trade and MP when considering
narrow product lines (see Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1988; Head and Ries, 2001; Barba-Navaretti and Ven-
ables, 2004; and Head and Ries, 2004). For example, increased presence of Japanese auto-makers in the U.S.
accompanies a decline in automobile exports from Japan (Head and Ries, 2001).
6Several studies ﬁnd that higher FDI leads to an increase in exports of parts and supplies from the home
country to foreign a liates (see Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1988; Blonigen, 2001; Head and Ries, 2001; Barba-
Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Head, Ries and Spencer, 2004).
7Recent attempts to compute the gains from trade in trade-only models are Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Fieler (2009), and Waugh (2009). See also Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare
(2009).
8Recent papers estimating gains from MP in MP-only models are Ramondo (2008), McGrattan and Precott
(2009), and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009).
2important goal in this paper is to gauge the strength of substitutability and complementarity
forces and then to explore their e ect on the gains from trade and MP.
We calibrate the model using data on bilateral trade and MP ﬂows for a set of OECD coun-
tries, as well as data on intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows for U.S. multinationals and foreign multinationals
operating in U.S. Trade data alone, however, cannot identify the parameter that determines the
strength of comparative advantage (i.e., the parameter   in Eaton and Kortum, 2002). Thus,
we appeal to the model’s implications for the long run real income growth rate to calibrate this
parameter.9 Importantly, growth is driven by the same mechanism that generates the gains
from openness in the static model, namely the aggregate economies of scale associated with the
fact that a larger population is linked to a higher stock of non-rival ideas. This is why calibrat-
ing the comparative advantage parameter so that the model’s implied growth rate matches the
one we observe in the data is a key part of the quantitative exercise.
The calibrated model entails strong aggregate economies of scale that lead to potentially
very large gains from openness. For example, in a world of one hundred symmetric countries,
moving from complete isolation to frictionless trade and MP would imply an increase in the real
wage of 150% in each country. The presence of high costs of trade and MP, however, imply that
the gains from openness are much lower than this. For example, our calibrated model implies
that the average gains from openness in a set of ﬁve small OECD countries (i.e., Finland,
Norway, Denmark, Greece and Portugal) are only 12%.10 Still, these gains from openness are
more than three times larger than the gains from trade calculated in trade-only models, which
for these ﬁve small countries are (on average) 4%.
Our results suggest that while the gains from trade are underestimated in quantitative ex-
ercises performed with trade-only models, the gains from MP calculated with MP-only models
are overestimated. The gains from trade calculated with our model are roughly twice as large
as the gains calculated in trade-only models (7.3% against 4%, on average, for the ﬁve small
countries mentioned above). This is because trade facilitates MP by allowing multinationals’
foreign a liates to import inputs from their home country. Since MP can be seen as a chan-
nel for international technology di usion (as it allows a country’s technologies to be used for
9Although the model we present is static, in the Appendix we show that the equilibrium of the static model
can be seen as the steady state equilibrium of a dynamic model where productivity evolves according to an
exogenous “research” process. This dynamic model exhibits “semi-endogenous” growth as in Jones (1995) and
Kortum (1997), and is closely related to Eaton and Kortum (2001).
10Each of these countries has roughly 1% of the OECD’s total estimated equipped labor force.
3production in other countries), our model captures the idea that trade facilitates technology
di usion.11 In contrast to this result for the gains from trade, the gains from MP calculated
in our calibrated model are slightly lower than the gains computed in MP-only models (5.6%
vs. 6.3% on average for the ﬁve small countries mentioned above). This is because the substi-
tutability forces associated with the fact that trade and MP are competing ways of serving a
foreign market dominate the complementarity forces created by BMP.
Our model is in principle consistent with the notion that the reallocation of production
to foreign countries by U.S. multinationals could depress domestic wages. This is because
outward MP could lead to a decline in U.S. exports, worsening its terms of trade.12 But there
is a countervailing force: outward MP also generates a demand for exports of inputs to foreign
subsidiaries.13 Our calibrated model shows that these two forces roughly balance each other
for the U.S. and hence outward MP has basically no net e ect on the U.S. real wage.
The models that come closest to the one we present here are Garetto (2009) and Irarrazabal,
Moxnes and Opromolla (2009).14 Garetto develops a model in which multinationals from the
rich country produce intermediate goods in low wage locations and then ship those goods
back home for ﬁnal assembly and consumption (there is no BMP). Garetto’s model entails an
extreme type of complementarity between trade and MP: without trade there would be no MP.
Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2009) introduce intra-ﬁrm trade into Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple’s (2004) “proximity-concentration tradeo ” model of trade and MP to explain the high
correlation observed between these two ﬂows across country pairs. The model does not allow for
multinationals’ foreign a liates to export their production (there is no BMP). Consistent with
our results, Irarrazabal et al. ﬁnd gains from MP that are smaller that the gains that would
be computed in models with only MP. Again, this is because of the forces of substitutability
between trade and MP. On the other hand, the absence of BMP implies that the gains from
MP computed by Irarrazabal et al. are signiﬁcantly lower than the ones we calculate using our
model.
11Yet, our model does not incorporate any causal link whereby trade or MP enhance international knowledge
spillovers. The large literature on this topic is surveyed in Keller (2004).
12Similar ideas have been presented in relation to the debate about o -shoring by rich countries, see Samuelson
(2004), Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2009). See also the empirical work on the e ect of outward FDI on employment in
the U.S. by Harrison and McMilan (2008) and in Germany by Becker and Muendler (2009).
13This mechanism is similar to the one in Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2009).
14Another related paper is Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2008), which explores the interactions between trade and di usion
in model that is also based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Eaton and Kortum (2006).
42 The Model
We extend Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) model of trade to incorporate MP. Our model is Ricar-
dian with a continuum of tradable intermediate goods and non-tradable ﬁnal goods, produced
under constant-returns-to-scale. We adopt the probabilistic representation of technologies as
ﬁrst introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2002), but we enrich it to incorporate MP. We embed
the model into a general equilibrium framework similar to the one in Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2.1 The Closed Economy
To introduce the notation and main features of our model, consider ﬁrst a closed economy
with L units of labor. A representative agent consumes a continuum of ﬁnal goods indexed by
u   [0,1] in quantities qf(u). Preferences over ﬁnal goods are CES with elasticity  f > 0. Final
goods are produced with labor and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by v   [0,1].
Formally, intermediate goods in quantities qg(v) are aggregated into a composite intermediate
good via a CES production function with elasticity  g > 0. We denote the total quantity
produced of this composite intermediate good as Q. The composite intermediate good and




1  . (1)
The variables Lf(u) and Qf(u) denote the quantity of labor and the composite intermediate
good used in the production of ﬁnal good u, respectively, and zf(u) is a productivity parameter.
Similarly, intermediate goods are produced according to
qg(v)=zg(v)Lg(v)
 Qg(v)














To complete the description of the environment in the closed economy, the productivity param-
eters zf(u) and zg(v) are random variables drawn independently from a Fr´ echet distribution
with parameters T and   > max{1,    1}, F(z) = exp
 
 Tz   
, for z>0.
5To describe the competitive equilibrium for this economy it is convenient to introduce the
notion of an input bundle for the production of ﬁnal goods, and an input bundle for the production
of intermediate goods, both of which are produced via Cobb-Douglas production functions
with labor and the composite intermediate good, and used to produce ﬁnal and intermediate
goods, as speciﬁed in (1) and (2), respectively. The unit cost of the input bundle for ﬁnal
goods is cf = Aw P 1  
g , and the unit cost of the input bundle for intermediate goods is
cg = Bw P 1  
g , where w and Pg are the wage and the price of the composite intermediate
good, respectively, and A and B are constants that depend on   and  , respectively. In a
competitive equilibrium prices of ﬁnal goods are given by pf(u)=cf/zf(u), and prices of
intermediate goods are given by pg(v)=cg/zg(v). In turn, the aggregate price for intermediates
is Pg =
   1
0 pg(v)1  gdv
 1/(1  g)
. Figure 1 illustrates the cost structure in the closed economy.





















   













    
 
The characterization of the equilibrium follows closely the analysis in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007), so we omit the details. Su ce it to say here that the
equilibrium real wage is given by
w
Pf
=     · T
1+ 
  , (3)
where Pf =
   1
0 pf(u)1  fdu
 1/(1  f)
is the price index for ﬁnal goods,     (1  )/ , and     is
a positive constant.15
15In Eaton and Kortum (2002) the real wage is proportional to T1/   while in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) the
real wage is proportional to T / . The di erence with Eaton and Kortum’s result arises because of the presence
62.2 The World Economy
Now consider a set of countries indexed by i   {1,...,I} with preferences and technologies
as described above. Country i has Li units of labor. Each country i has a technology to
produce each ﬁnal good and each intermediate good, at home or abroad. These technologies are
described by the vectors zfi(u)   {zf1i(u),...,zfIi(u)} and zgi(v)   {zg1i(v),...,zgIi(v)}. When
a country i produces in another country l  = i, we say that there is multinational production or
MP by country i in country l. Sometimes, we also say that MP in country l is carried out by
country i “multinationals”. The corresponding productivity parameter in this case is zfli(u),
or zgli(v). We adopt the convention that the subscript n denotes the destination country, l
the country of production, and i the country where the technology originates. Note that if
zfli(u)=zgli(v) = 0 whenever l  = i, for all u,v   [0,1], our model collapses to the Alvarez and
Lucas (2007) version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of trade with no MP.
Intermediate goods are tradable but ﬁnal goods are not. Trade is subject to iceberg-type
costs: dnl   1 units of any good must be shipped from country l for one unit to arrive in country
n. We assume that dnn = 1 for all n and the triangle inequality holds: dnl   dnjdjl for all n,l,j.
Similarly, MP incurs an iceberg-type e ciency loss of hsli   1 associated with using an idea
from i to produce in l, with hsii = 1 for all i, for s = f,g. Thus, whereas national production
of ﬁnal good u in country l entails unit cost cfl/zfll(u), MP of ﬁnal good u by i in l entails
unit cost cflhfli/zfli(u). Similarly, whereas national production of intermediate good v in l
has unit cost cgl/zgll(v), MP of intermediate good v by i in l entails unit cost cgli/zgli(v). The
unit cost cgli di ers from cglhgli because we assume that MP in intermediate goods requires the
use of what we call a multinational input bundle for the production of intermediate goods. In
particular, we assume that the multinational input bundle combines the national input bundle
from the home country (i.e., the country where the technology originates) and the host country
(i.e., the country where production takes place). The home country national input bundle
must be shipped to the host country of production, and this implies paying the corresponding
transportation cost. The unit cost of the home country national input bundle used in MP by
country i in country l is then cgidli. The host country national input bundle has unit cost cgl,
but MP in intermediates incurs an e ciency loss of hgli   1, so the unit cost of the host country
of non-tradable goods whereas the di erence with Alvarez and Lucas arises because in our model T also a ects
the productivity of ﬁnal goods. The proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix contains the derivation of this
result.
7national input used in MP by i in l is cglhgli. Combining the costs of home and host country
national input bundles into a CES aggregator, the unit cost of the multinational input bundle
for intermediates produced by i in l is
cgli =
 
(1   a)(cglhgli)





where a   [0,1] and   > 1. Note that cgii = cgi. Moreover, if a = 0, then cgli = cglhgli. The
parameter   indicates the degree of substitutability between the national input bundles from
the home and host countries.
Finally, we assume that the productivity vectors zfi(u) and zgi(v) for each good are random
variables that are drawn independently across goods and countries from a multivariate Fr´ echet























so that the marginal distributions are Fr´ echet. The parameter   determines the degree of
correlation among the elements of zsi: if   = 0, productivity levels are uncorrelated across pro-
duction locations, while in the limit as     1 they are perfectly correlated, so that productivity
is independent of the production location (i.e., zsii = zsli, for all l).
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Since ﬁnal goods are identical except for their productivity parameters (i.e., they enter pref-
erences symmetrically), we follow Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and drop index u, labeling ﬁnal
goods by Zf   (zf1,...,zfI). Similarly, we label intermediate goods by Zg   (zg1,...,zgI).
The unit cost of a ﬁnal good Zf in country n produced with a technology from country i is
cfnhni/zfni, while the unit cost of an intermediate good Zg in country n produced in country l
with a technology from country i is cglidnl/zgli.
In a competitive equilibrium the price of ﬁnal good Zf in country n is simply the minimum
unit cost at which this good can be obtained, pfn(Zf) = mini cfnhfni/zfni. Similarly, the price
16This distribution is discussed in footnote 14, Eaton and Kortum (2002).
8of intermediate good Zg in country n is pgn(Zg) = mini,l cglidnl/zgli. Note that if l = i, then the
intermediate good is exported from i to n while if i  = l = n there is MP from i to n. Finally,
if i  = l and l  = n then country l is used as an export platform by country i to serve country n.
We say that in this case there is “bridge MP”, or simply BMP, by country i in country l.
Recall that in Eaton and Kortum (2002) the allocation of expenditures across exporters is
elegantly characterized by simple formulas of the technology parameters, unit costs, and trade
costs. Thanks to the assumption that technologies are distributed according to the multivariate
Fr´ echet distribution, this property extends in a natural way in our model to the allocation of
expenditures across technology sources and production locations.
Lemma 1 (a) The shares of expenditure by country n on ﬁnal and intermediate goods produced









 fni   Tni (cfnhfni)









 1  
, and  sn  
 
i
 sni, for s = f,g;
(b) Of the total expenditure by country n on intermediate goods produced with country i tech-









It is easy to show that the price index in country n for ﬁnal goods (s = f) and intermediates
(s = g) is given by
Psn =  s 
 1/ 
sn , (6)
where  s    (1 + (1    s)/ )1/1  , and  (·) is the Gamma function.17 Since  fn and  gn
are functions of the unit costs, (cf1,...,cfn) and (cg1,...,cgn), which in turn are a function of
wages and the price indices (Pg1,...,Pgn), the set of equations associated with (6), for s = g and
n = {1,...,I}, implicitly determines Pgn as a function of w =( w1,...,wI). In vector notation,
this deﬁnes the function Pg(w): I   I (see Alvarez and Lucas, 2007). Together with Pg(w),
17This follows just as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) given that the price distributions in country n of interme-
diate and ﬁnal goods are Ggn(p)=1  exp
 
  gnp  
and Gfn(p)=1  exp
 
  fnp  
, respectively.
9equation (6) for s = f also deﬁnes a function Pf(w) that determines the price index for ﬁnal
goods as a function of wages.
We next use the results of Lemma 1 to characterize trade and MP ﬂows and to close the
model with the trade balance conditions.18 The total expenditure on ﬁnal goods by country n
is equal to the country’s total income, wnLn. We refer to the total value of ﬁnal goods produced
in n with country i technologies as the value of MP in ﬁnal goods by i in n, denoted by Yfni.
Part (b) of Lemma 1 implies that  sni and  sni,l not only represent the share of goods purchased
by country n produced with di erent technologies and in di erent production locations, but
also expenditure shares. Thus,
Yfni =  fniwnLn.
Note that
 
i Yfni = wnLn
 
i  fni = wnLn.
Since total expenditure on intermediates by country n is PgnQn, the value of MP in interme-
diates by country i in country l to serve country n is  gni gni,lPgnQn. Thus, MP in intermediates




 gni gni,lPgnQn. (7)
Total imports by country n from l are given by the sum of intermediate goods produced
in country l with technologies from any other country,
 
i  gni gni,lPgnQn, plus the imports
of country l’s input bundle for intermediates used by country l’s multinationals operating in
country n. For concreteness, we refer to the ﬁrst type of trade as “arms-length” and the second
type of trade as “intra-ﬁrm”. To compute intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows, let  nl be the cost share of the
home country input bundle for the production of intermediates in country n by multinationals
from country l. From equation (4),  nl = a(cgldnl/cgnl)
1  . The value of imports of the input
bundle for intermediates by n from l associated with MP by l in n is  nlYgnl. Total imports by




 gni gni,lPgnQn +  nlYgnl. (8)
For country n , aggregate imports are
 
l =n Xnl, while aggregate exports are
 
l =n Xln. The







18The trade balance conditions are the appropriate equilibrium conditions given that MP entails no proﬁts
under perfect competition.
10As in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), the total expenditure on the composite intermediate good
is proportional to the country’s total income. Formally,
Lemma 2 PgnQn =  wnLn, for all n.
Since the terms  gni,  gni,l, and  li are functions of w, the trade balance conditions in
(9) constitute a system of I equations in w. This system of equations together with some
normalization of wages yields an equilibrium wage vector w. The functions Pg(w) and Pf(w)
deﬁned above then determine the price indices for intermediate and ﬁnal goods in all countries.
2.4 Gravity Equations
We now now show that arms-length trade and MP ﬂows satisfy modiﬁed gravity equations.
Given equation (8), arms-length exports from l to n are given by




For the special case with   = 0 these trade ﬂows satisfy a gravity equation similar to that
in Eaton and Kortum (2002) except that the technology parameters determining the location
of the productivity distributions in each country are “augmented” by the possibility of MP.





gli be an augmented technology parameter for the production of
intermediate goods in country l that takes into account the possibility of using technologies
from other countries appropriately discounted by the e ciency losses hgli. Applying Lemma 1
it can be shown that arms-length trade ﬂows from l to n are





k T  
gk (cgkdnk)
   wnLn. (10)
This implies that country l s normalized import share in country n depends only on the trade







   
. (11)
This is exactly like in Eaton and Kortum (2002) -see their equation (12). In the gravity
literature, dnl is referred to as the “bilateral resistance” term while Pgl and Pgn are “multilateral
resistance” terms.
11Overall trade ﬂows will not satisfy a gravity equation because arms-length and intra-ﬁrm
trade ﬂows are subject to two di erent elasticities with respect to trade costs: the Eaton and
Kortum elasticity,  , and the elasticity     1 that indicates the degree of substitution between
Home and local input bundles for MP. Gravity relations do not hold even when considering only
arms-length trade ﬂows in the general case with   > 0. The reason is that there are I2 ways to
produce any intermediate good, resulting from the combination of I source countries and I pro-
duction locations. The productivity parameters zg1i,z g2i,...,zgIi associated with source country
i are positively correlated (since   > 0) whereas the productivity parameters zgl1,z gl2,...,zglI
associated with production location l are uncorrelated (by assumption of independence across
the vectors zgi, for i =1 ,2,...,I). The di erent degrees of correlation among the elements of
the columns and rows of the Zg matrix makes it generally impossible to express all the determi-
nants of bilateral trade and MP ﬂows in a bilateral resistance term together with multilateral
resistance terms, as in equation (11).19
In the case with   = 0 MP ﬂows also satisfy a gravity-like relationship. Using equation (7)
and some manipulation, we have
Ygli =












   
 wnLn
can be interpreted as country l s market potential. The term Tli( gcgli)  /P
  
gl captures the







   
, (13)






gii) is an average relative cost of producing in country l rather than in
country i with country i’s technologies. The term   hgli in equation (13) plays the analogous role
of the bilateral resistance term d
  
nl in equation (11).
19One exception is when Tlih
  
li is “separable” in the sense that it can be written as the product of a source
and a destination-speciﬁc terms: Tlih
  
gli =  lµi, for all l,i. In this case we obtain an expression similar to (10)
but with T 
gl substituted by T  
gl =  
1/(1  )
l , and   substituted by  /(1    ). The reason why this works is that
the distribution of (  zg1,  zg2,...,  zgI), for   zgl   maxi {zgli/cgli}, is also a multivariate Fr´ echet with parameters  
and  .





   
wnLn. Adding up over n and using trade balance,
 
n Xnl =  wlLl, we see that  gl =
 wlLl
Xll/ wlLl: larger and more open countries have a higher market potential.
122.5 Gains from trade, MP, and openness
In this paper we are particularly interested in quantifying the country-level gains from trade,
MP, and openness. We ﬁrst establish some terminology.
The gains from openness for country n (GOn) are given by the proportional change in
country n s real wage, wn/Pfn, as we move from a counterfactual equilibrium characterized by
isolation, which attains when trade and MP costs are inﬁnite (dnl,h sli   for n  = l, l  = i,
and s = f,g), to the actual equilibrium.
The gains from trade for country n (GTn) are given by the proportional change in wn/Pfn
as we move from the counterfactual equilibrium with MP but no trade (actual hsli for all l,i
and s = f,g but dnl   for n  = l) to the actual equilibrium.
Similarly, the gains from MP for country n (GMPn) are given by the proportional change in
wn/Pfn as we move from the counterfactual equilibrium with trade but no MP for all countries
(actual dnl for all n,l but hsli   for all l,i and s = f,g) to the actual equilibrium. The
gains from MP can be decomposed into those that arise from MP in intermediates, GMPgn,
and those that arise from MP in ﬁnal goods, GMPfn, with GMPn = GMPfn  GMPgn.
We are interested in comparing GTn and GMPn with the gains that would be computed in
models with only trade and models with only MP. We refer to these gains as GT  
n and GMP  
n,
respectively. Formally, GT  
n (GMP  
n) is the proportional change in country n s real wage as we
move from a counterfactual equilibrium characterized by isolation to an equilibrium with no
MP (trade) but with the same trade (MP) ﬂows as in the actual equilibrium.21 The following
lemma establishes that GT  
n and GMP  
n can be calculated as simple formulas from trade and
MP shares, respectively.
Lemma 3 The gains from trade and the gains from MP in trade-only and MP-only models can























  1/ 
, (16)
21Of course, the trade (MP) costs necessary to yield the same trade (MP) ﬂows as in the actual equilibrium
may be di erent in a trade-only (MP-only) model than in our model with trade and MP.
13with the total gains from MP given by GMP  
n = GMP  
gn · GMP  
fn.
The formula for the gains from trade as a function of normalized trade ﬂows in equation (14)
is very similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002) (see their equation 15) and exactly the same as the
one that applies in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). The formulas for gains from MP in intermediates
in equation (15) and in ﬁnal goods in equation (16) are analogous to the expressions for the
gains from trade.
One of the main points of this paper is that GTn can be higher or lower than GT  
n because
of the forces of substitutability and complementarity present in our model. If GTn > GT  
n then
we say that trade is MP-complement: the gains from trade are higher than the ones that would
be computed in trade-only models because trade also leads to gains by facilitating MP. On the
contrary, if GTn < GT  
n then we say that trade is MP-substitute: the gains from trade are lower
than the ones that would be computed in trade-only models because trade decreases the gains
from MP. If GTn = GT  
n then we say that trade is MP-independent.
Analogously, if GMPn < GMP  
n then we say that MP is trade-substitute while if GMPn >
GMP  
n (GMPn = GMP  
n) then we say that MP is trade-complement (trade-independent).
2.6 Three special cases
Before presenting the calibration of the full model in the next section, it is instructive to consider
three special cases for which we can derive analytical results: (1) the case with a =   = 0, which
implies that trade is MP-independent, (2) the case of symmetric countries, and (3) the case of
a rich and a poor country with a = 0 and frictionless trade.
2.6.1 a =   =0
The following proposition establishes that if a =   = 0 then trade is MP-independent. In this
case, models with only trade can be safely used to compute gains from trade and this can be
done using a simple formula that expresses the gains from trade as a function of trade shares.
Proposition 1 Assume a =   =0 . Then trade is MP-independent in the sense that GTn =
GT  
n. Moreover, GOn = GT  
n   GMP  
n.
To understand this result, recall that our model captures two opposite forces a ecting
the relationship between trade and MP. First, trade tends to be MP-complement because of
14the need to import home-country intermediate goods by multinationals’ foreign subsidiaries.
Second, trade tends to be MP-substitute because trade and MP are alternative ways to serve a
particular market. The ﬁrst force is not present if a = 0 because in this case foreign subsidiaries
do not demand home-country intermediate goods. The second force is not present if   =0
because with no correlation across productivities in di erent locations, there is a sense in which
there is no longer a technology that can be used in di erent countries. This Proposition implies
that if a =   = 0 then it would be valid to use the trade-only model to compute gains from trade.
Moreover, as the last part of the Proposition establishes, one can jointly use the trade-only and
MP-only models to compute the overall gains from openness since GOn = GT  
n   GMP  
n.
In contrast to the result that trade is MP-independent, parameters a =   = 0 do not
imply that MP is trade-independent. The following lemma establishes the relationship between
GMPn and GMP  
n for this case:
Lemma 4 Let   Xnn/ wnLn be the domestic demand share in the counterfactual equilibrium with






  Xnn/ wnLn
   / 
.
Two simple examples help to illustrate this result. In both examples there are two countries
labeled North (N) and South (S), with TNN = TSN = TN and TNS = TSS = TS. The ﬁrst
example has TN > 0 but TS = 0. The equilibrium in this case entails MP by North in South but
no MP by South in North. Since South has no technologies of its own, there would be no trade
in the counterfactual equilibrium with no MP, hence   XNN/ wNLN = 1. But XNN/ wNLN < 1
in the actual equilibrium. This implies that GMPN > GMP  
N, so MP is trade-complement
for North. This example captures the gains from BMP for North, which can satisfy domestic
demand at a lower cost by using its superior technologies to produce in South. In the second
example we have frictionless trade and both regions are identical except that South is small:
TN/LN = TS/LS and LS <L N. It is easy to show that in this case the domestic demand share
for South increases as we move from the counterfactual equilibrium with no MP to the actual
equilibrium with MP (XSS/ wSLS >   XSS/ wSLS). This implies that GMPS < GMP  
S, so MP
is trade-substitute for South: as South becomes more productive thanks to MP, it e ectively
becomes larger and the gains from trade decline.
152.6.2 Symmetry
The symmetric case can be solved analytically, yet the basic intuition regarding the role of the
various parameters carries to the general case with asymmetric countries. We derive intuitive
formulas for the gains from trade, MP and openness, and then explore the conditions under
which trade (MP) behaves as substitute or complement for MP (trade). We are also interested
in di erentiating between the complementarity that arises from the possibility of doing BMP
and the one that arises from the use of the home country’s input bundle in multinational
activities.
Symmetry entails Li = L for all i, Tli = T, for all l,i, and dnl = d and hfnl = hgnl = h
for all l  = n. In equilibrium, wages, costs, and prices are equalized across countries, wn = w,
cn = c, and Psn = Ps, for s = g,f and all n. Thus, the cost of the multinational input bundle
collapses to cgli = m · cg, for all l  = i, with m  
 
(1   a)h1   + ad1    1
1  , and cgll = cg for all
l. The share of spending on the home input bundle done by MP is simply   = a(d/m)1  .
The equilibrium is characterized as follows (see the Appendix for formal derivations). In the
case of ﬁnal goods the situation is straightforward: a country uses some of its own technologies
to serve domestic consumers through local production, and also to serve foreign consumers
through MP. For intermediate goods, there is trade, MP, and BMP: countries use some of
their own technologies to produce at home to serve domestic and foreign consumers (through
exports), and they use some of their technologies for MP whose output is sold to local consumers
(MP), sent back home or sold to third markets (BMP).22 There is also trade associated with
the import of the home country input bundle for MP.
The following proposition shows how access to foreign ideas through trade and MP increases
a country’s real wage.
Proposition 2 Under symmetry we have
GO =
 
1+( I   1)h
   1/ 
· [ 0 +( I   1) 1]
 /  , (17)
GT =
GO
limd   GO
=
 
 0 +( I   1) 1
1+( I   1)  m  




limh   GO
=
 
1+( I   1)h
   1/ 
 
 
 0 +( I   1) 1
1+( I   1)d  
  / 
, (19)
22The assumption that technologies are draws from a multivariate Fr´ echet distribution with     [0,1) implies
that there is some BMP even with symmetric countries; BMP vanishes only when     1.
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The expression for the gains from openness in equation (17) indicates that a country that
opens up to both trade and MP in the intermediate goods’ sector beneﬁts from using its own
technologies at home and abroad, captured by the term  0, and I   1 foreign technologies,
captured by the term  1. When domestic technologies are used (the term  0), production can
be carried out in I 1 foreign locations through MP at the cost m, and then goods shipped back
home at the cost d. Hence, technologies are “fully” discounted by (md)  /(1  ). In turn, foreign
technologies can be accessed by importing goods in which case they are discounted by d  /(1  )
(ﬁrst term in  1), by doing MP in which case they are discounted by m  /(1  ) (second term in
 1), and by doing BMP in I  2 di erent locations in which case the full discount (md)  /(1  )
applies (third term in  1). The term in the ﬁrst bracket in equation (17) captures the gains
from accessing (I  1) foreign technologies through MP in the ﬁnal goods’ sector, at a discount
of h  .
It is clear that the gains from openness decrease with h as well as d: the higher trade or
MP costs, the lower the gains from openness. Additionally, the parameter   appears in GO in
association with intermediate goods: as   indicates the correlation between technology draws
for a given source country across di erent production locations, it matters only when both trade
and MP are allowed. As one would expect, GO decreases with  . In the case where     1 (so
that zsli = zsji for all l,j and s = g,f), BMP in intermediate goods vanishes. Furthermore,
in this case, trade and MP do not overlap: if d>h , there is only MP (and trade associated
with MP, i.e., imports of the home country input bundle), but no other trade of individual
intermediate goods; in contrast, if h > d, there is only trade but no MP (see the Appendix).
The expression for GT in equation (18) indicates that a country that opens up to trade
beneﬁts through specialization according to Ricardian comparative advantage (which here takes
into account trade ﬂows associated with BMP) and from the fact that trade facilitates MP
by allowing multinational a liates to import inputs from their home country. The following
proposition describes parameter conﬁgurations under which trade is MP-complement or MP-
substitute.
17Proposition 3 Assume countries are symmetric. (a) If   =0and a>0, trade is MP-
complement, and if   > 0 and a =0 , trade is MP-substitute. (b) Assume a,  > 0. If     1,
trade is MP-complement, while if h < d and     then trade is MP-substitute.
To gain some intuition for these results, start from the case with a =   = 0, for which
we know from Proposition 1 that trade is MP-independent. As   increases above zero, the
positive correlation between productivity draws across locations generates substitutability. Al-
ternatively, as a increases above zero, the demand for home-country inputs by multinationals
introduces complementarity. If both   > 0 and a>0 then we need to consider the parameter
 . If   is close to 1, the low elasticity of substitution between home and host country inputs
for MP generates no gains from MP if trade is not possible. Hence, trade is MP-complement.
Conversely, if   is high then only the cheapest input bundle is used for MP; if h < d then trade
does not contribute to decrease MP costs. This implies that trade is MP-substitute.
Turning to the gains from MP, the ﬁrst term of the RHS in (19) captures the gains associated
with ﬁnal goods, whereas the second term captures the gains associated with intermediate
goods. For intermediates, the gains from MP are a ected by the substitutability between trade
and MP that arises for   > 0.
Proposition 4 Assume countries are symmetric. If   =0 , MP is trade-independent while if
  > 0 MP is trade-substitute.
We emphasize two implications of this proposition. First, the value of a does not a ect
whether MP is trade-independent or trade-substitute. This is because while trade facilitates
MP by reducing the unit cost of the multinational input bundle (m<  m if a>0), MP does
not facilitate trade; MP only adds a competing alternative to trade in serving other markets.
Second, the result that MP is trade-independent for   > 0 is consistent with Lemma 4: under
symmetry we have   Xnn/ wnLn = Xnn/ wnLn. This is because in this case MP a ects all
countries equally and therefore has no e ect on trade shares.
2.6.3 Two countries with a =0and frictionless trade
This special case shows that the rich country can experience losses from MP. We consider two
countries labeled North (N) and South (S), with TNN = TSN = TN, TNS = TSS = TS, and
TN/LN >T S/LS. This last feature implies that wages will tend to be higher in North than in
18South. We assume that MP generates no demand for home-country intermediate goods (a = 0)
and that trade is frictionless (dNS = dSN = 1). Our main result for this case is established in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 There exists      [0,1) such that North gains from frictionless MP in inter-
mediate goods (GMPgN > 1) for     [0,  ) while it loses for     (  ,1) (GMPgN < 1).
The reason why MP can have a negative impact on the rich country is that outward MP
e ectively reduces the demand for a country’s exports, worsening its terms of trade.23 But
this relies on there being strong substitutability between trade and MP as alternative ways
of serving foreign markets, hence the need for a high correlation parameter   for this to be a
dominant e ect. Note that here we have assumed a = 0 – in general, with a>0, outward
MP would generate an increased demand for home-country inputs, and this would make it less




We restrict our analysis to the set of nineteen OECD countries considered by Eaton and Ko-
rtum (2002): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Swe-
den, United States. Except when mentioned otherwise, all the data is averaged over the period
1990-2002. We use STAN data on manufacturing trade ﬂows from country i to country n as
the empirical counterpart for trade in intermediates in the model, Xni. We use UNCTAD data
on the gross value of production for multinational a liates from i in n as the empirical coun-
terpart of bilateral MP ﬂows in the model, Yni   Yfni + Ygni. We normalize bilateral trade
ﬂows by the importer’s total expenditure on intermediate goods, and bilateral MP ﬂows by
total expenditure on ﬁnal goods in the host country.
23A similar negative terms of trade e ect has been noted in regards to o -shoring by rich countries (see
Samuelson, 2004, and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, 2009).
24It is also important to note that in our model outward MP generates no proﬁts, since there is perfect
competition. Such proﬁts would lead to additional gains from MP for rich countries as in Burstein and Monge-
Naranjo (2009).
19Apart from the bilateral trade and MP data, our quantitative model should also be con-
sistent with moments regarding the importance of intra-ﬁrm trade by multinationals and the
importance of MP in ﬁnal goods relative to all MP. The necessary data to compute these
moments are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the U.S., but not
systematically for other countries. We also use data from the BEA to compute a measure of
BMP for foreign a liates of U.S. multinationals and for U.S. a liates of foreign multinationals.
The Appendix presents more detail on the data and some summary statistics.
3.2 Calibration Procedure
Trade and MP costs. We reduce the number of parameters to calibrate by assuming that
bilateral trade and MP costs in the intermediate goods’ sector are a function of distance and
whether countries share a border and language, respectively,
dni = 1 + ( 
d
0 +  
d
distdistni)   ( 
d
border)
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h
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for all n  = i, with dnn = 1 and hgnn = 1. The variable distni is the distance between i and n.
The variable bni (lni) equals one if countries share a border (a language), and zero otherwise.25
Hence, if  border < 1 countries that share a border have lower iceberg costs. Similarly, if
 language < 1, countries speaking the same language have lower iceberg costs. From this cost
speciﬁcation, we need to calibrate a set of eight parameters,

















We further assume that MP costs in the ﬁnal good sector are proportional to the ones in the
intermediate good sector,
hfni = max[1,µ· hgni]. (25)
Parameters  ,  , and  . We set the labor share in the intermediate goods’ sector,  , to 0.5,
and the labor share in the ﬁnal sector,  , to 0.75, as calibrated by Alvarez and Lucas (2007).26
This implies     (1    )/  =0 .5.
25Data on bilateral distance, common border, and common language is from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives
et Informations internationales (CEPII).
26They calibrate the parameters   and   to match the fraction of U.S. employment in the non-tradable sector
and the share of value added in gross manufacturing output, respectively. Jones (2009) also uses   =0 .5.
20For the parameter   which captures the degree of complementarity between home and
host country inputs for MP, we appeal to estimates from the labor literature. Becker and
Muendler (2009) estimate cross-wage elasticities of labor demand for German multinationals
across multiple production locations. Their results suggest a value of approximately   =1 .5.27,28
Fr´ echet Parameters. The parameters that characterize the multivariate Fr´ echet distribution
are  ,  , and the matrix {Tli}. Since we cannot recover the parameter   from a gravity regression
due to the presence of MP, we appeal to the model’s implications for the growth rate of real
income. As we show in the Appendix, the static model presented above is fully consistent with
a dynamic model where the productivity matrices Zg and Zf evolve according to an exogenous
“research” process whereby the arrival of ideas is proportional to the workforce. This dynamic
model exhibits “semi-endogenous” growth as in Jones (1995) and Kortum (1997), and is closely
related to Eaton and Kortum (2001). Importantly, growth is driven by the same forces that
generate the gains from openness in the static model, namely the aggregate economies of scale
associated with the fact that a larger population is linked to a higher stock of non-rival ideas. It
then seems natural to calibrate   to match the growth rate of real income per worker observed
in the data.
Growth rates in the steady state are the same for all countries, and not a ected by openness.
This implies that the growth rate for the open economy is the same as the one for the closed







where gT is the growth rate of the parameter T. In our multi-country model, there is no single
parameter T but rather a matrix {Tli}. But, since all these Tli’s grow at a common rate gT, the
growth rate of the real wage for the open economy is the same as the one in equation (26) for the
closed economy. Since we assume that the arrival of ideas is proportional to the workforce, in
the long run gT is equal to the growth rate of labor, which we assume common across countries.
However, as argued in Jones (2002), the last decades have been characterized by an increase in
27Becker and Muendler estimate that the e ect of a 1% increase in German wages on the demand for labor
by multinationals in other countries of Western Europe is 1.2. Since the average share of these multinationals’
wage bill allocated to German workers is 62%, the implied elasticity of substitution is 1.94. They also estimate
that the elasticity of German multinationals labor demand in Germany to wages in Western Europe is 0.2..
Given that the average share of these multinationals’ wage bill allocated to Western European workers is 15%,
the implied elasticity of substitution is 1.3. The average of these two elasticities is close to 1.5.
28This is also close to the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, which Katz and
Murphy (1992) estimate at 1.4.
21the share of employment in R&D. Since the faster increase in R&D employment would surely
a ect the growth rate of T, it is important to take this into account in the calibration. Following
Jones (2002), we use the growth rate of R&D employment over the last decades in the ﬁve top
R&D-performing countries as our measure of the growth rate of T.29 For the period 1950-1993,
Jones (2002) calculates this growth rate to be 4.8%, so we set gT =0 .048.
Although g in our model stands for the growth rate of real wages or real GDP per capita,
in the calibration we need to consider the role of physical and human capital accumulation.
Thus, we use the growth rate of TFP as a calibration target for g. Based on Jones (2002), we
set g =0 .01. Using (26) and   =0 .5, gT =0 .048 and g =0 .01 imply   =7 .2.30 This value
is remarkably close to the central values of   estimated by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Alvarez
and Lucas (2007), and Simonovska and Waugh (2009) following di erent methodologies and
sets of countries (the respective values are 8.3, 6.7, and 7.5).
The dynamic model derived in the Appendix implies that Tli =  i, where  i represents the
stock of ideas in country i and is proportional to Li. We allow  i/Li to di er across countries
and assume that it varies directly with the share of R&D employment observed in the data (an
average over the nineties taken from the World Development Indicators). Thus, for example,
since the share of R&D employment in the U.S. is 0.9% and in Greece it is 0.3%, we assume
that  /L is three times higher in the U.S. than in Greece.
Finally, regarding the parameter  , which indicates the degree of correlation of technology
draws across production locations, we choose to ﬁx it to a central value of   =0 .5 and also
explore the alternative with   = 0 (no correlation). We chose not to include this parameter in
our calibration procedure below as its e ect on trade and MP shares is rather indirect. All our
results, particularly the results on gains in the next section, are robust to di erent values for
 .31
Country sizes. We choose to calibrate the vector L   {L1,...,L19} rather than using data
on total employment because our model abstracts from physical and human capital as well as
di erences in production e ciency not captured in  i/Li. Thus, we set L so that the implied
real GDP in the model, wnLn/Pfn, matches the one we observe in the data (real GDP -PPP
29These countries are France, West Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom.
30An alternative approach to calibrate   is to target the elasticity of TFP to population across countries while
controlling for the e ects of trade, institutions and geography, as in Alcala and Ciccone (2004). Depending
on the speciﬁcation, these authors ﬁnd an elasticity ranging from 1/6 to 1/4.5, a range which encompasses an
elasticity of 1/4.8 as implied by   =7 .2.
31We also experienced with   =0 .9 obtaining similar results (not shown).
22adjusted- from the Penn World Tables 6.2, average over the nineties).
Table 1 summarizes the values and deﬁnitions for parameters calibrated independently of
the algorithm presented next.
Parameter Value Source Deﬁnition
  0.5 Alvarez and Lucas (2007) labor share in ﬁnal sector
  0.75 Alvarez and Lucas (2007) labor share in intermediate sector
  1.5 Becker and Muendler (2009) elasticity of substitution in eq. (4)
 i/Li in Table 10 share of R&D employment per capita stock of ideas in country i
  7.2 eq. (26) with g =0 .01, gT =0 .048 variability parameter in M.V. Fr´ echet
  {0,0.5} – correlation parameter in M.V. Fr´ echet
Table 1: Parameter Values.
Calibration Algorithm. For a given value for  , the values for  ,  ,  ,  , a set of parameters
[  ,L,a,µ], and the data matrices for bilateral distance, common border and common language,
we compute the equilibrium and generate a simulated data set with 361 observations (one for
each country-pair, including the domestic pairs), for the following variables: trade shares, MP
shares and real GDP levels. Additionally, the model generates bilateral “intra-ﬁrm” trade to
MP ratios,  liYgli/(Ygli + Yfli), MP in the intermediate goods sector as a share of total MP,
Ygli/(Ygli + Yfli), and BMP as a share of total MP,
 
n =l  gni gni,lXgn/(Ygli+Yfli). We compute
averages of these three variables across country pairs where the United States are either the
home or host country (i.e., i = US or l = US).
Let R2
H be a measure of the explanatory power of the model for bilateral trade shares and













ni )2 , (27)
where H stands for either trade shares, Xni/( wnLn), or MP shares, Yni/(wnLn). The algorithm
used to compute the model’s equilibrium extends the one in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Given
the vector  , the parameters a and µ and the vector L are chosen so that the model matches the
the moments computed above for the importance of intra-ﬁrm trade and MP in intermediate
goods as well as real GDP levels in the data. The parameters in   are then chosen to minimize
the loss function (1   R2
  X) + (1   R2
  Y).
233.3 Results
Table 2 reports the calibrated parameters while Table 3 summarizes statistics from the data
and calibrated model. We report the vector L in the Appendix.
  = 0.5   = 0
Cost Parameters: trade MP trade MP
Distance  dist 0.059 0.063 0.065 0.067
Common Border  border 0.75 0.90 0.74 0.97
Common Language  language 0.68 0.63 0.73 0.64
Constant  0 0.50 0.64 0.63 0.95
Average Costs 1.81 1.97 1.97 2.30
Standard Deviation of Costs 0.22 0.22 (0.23) (0.22)
[min,max] [1.27,2.65] [1.37,2.87] [1.34,2.89] [1.60,3.26]
“Intra-ﬁrm” trade parameter a 0.15 0.14
MP cost parameter for ﬁnal sector µ 1.25 1.07
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters.
For both calibrations, the e ect of distance on trade and MP costs is similar: a 10% in-
crease in distance between a country-pair increases costs by almost 2% for both trade and
MP.32 Both calibrations suggest that a common border decreases trade costs by more than MP
costs ( d
border <  h
border), while the opposite is true for country-pairs with a common language
( d
language >  h
language). These calibrated “gravity” parameters translate into MP costs in the
tradable sector that are almost 10% (20%) higher on average than trade costs, for   =0 .5
(  = 0). Moreover, the high correlation between bilateral trade and MP shares in the data
of 0.71 is reﬂected in a very high correlation between trade and MP costs of 0.99 (0.98 when
  = 0).
The next two tables illustrate how well the model matches the patterns in the data along
several dimensions. Table 3 reports statistics from the data and the model’s equilibrium at the
calibrated parameters. For bilateral trade and MP shares, we report mean, standard deviation
and correlation coe cient. We also show the average BMP share implied by the model for U.S.
a liates abroad and U.S. a liates of foreign multinationals.
While the average bilateral trade and MP shares generated by the model are similar to
the ones in the data, the correlation between the two ﬂows is slightly higher in the model.
32This is computed for country-pairs that do not share a border or a language and that are separated by the
average distance across all country pairs.
24Data Model
  =0 .5   =0
Bilateral trade share
average 0.019 0.018 0.018
standard deviation 0.035 0.03 0.03
Bilateral MP share
average 0.022 0.018 0.017
standard deviation 0.045 0.031 0.030
Correlation Coe cient bilateral trade and MP shares 0.70 0.82 0.85
Average “BMP” by US in l 0.30 0.03 0.13
(as share of MP by US in l)
Average “BMP” by i in US 0.05 0.003 0.025
(as share of MP by i in US)
Table 3: Summary Statistics. Data and Calibrated Model.
Regarding BMP, our model is reassuringly consistent with the data in the sense that the share
of BMP for U.S. a liates abroad is much higher than the share of BMP for U.S. a liates of
foreign multinationals. This is what we would expect since the U.S. is the largest country in
our sample and has the (second) highest research intensity (see table 10 in the Appendix),
discouraging the use of the U.S. as an export platform. For both   = 0 and   =0 .5, however,
our model fails to generate as much BMP as observed in the data.
Table 4 shows the measure of the model’s explanatory power in equation (27), for bilateral
trade and MP separately. Additionally, it presents correlations between magnitudes in the
model and data for bilateral trade and MP shares across country-pairs, as well as correlations
for aggregate exports, imports, outward MP and inward MP, as shares of GDP of the source
and receiving country, respectively.
Both R2’s and correlation coe cients for bilateral trade and MP shares are high, indicating
that the model captures fairly well the observed bilateral patterns of these two ﬂows. When
we express total exports and total imports as shares of GDP the correlations between model
and data are still high. Correlations are lower but still fairly positive when we compute total
outward and inward MP as shares of GDP. The model performs poorly in capturing the level
of outward and inward MP shares for the largest countries in the sample (i.e., Germany, Japan,
and the United States). Table 11 and scatters in the Appendix shows the actual and simulated
data for these four variables for each country against country size.33
33One could, of course, allow for more degrees of freedom in the calibration of trade and MP costs. For
25  = 0.5   = 0
Model’s R2
bilateral trade shares 0.76 0.75
bilateral MP shares 0.65 0.64
Correlations between model and data
bilateral trade shares 0.83 0.83
bilateral MP shares 0.76 0.75
total exports shares 0.80 0.77
total imports shares 0.81 0.82
total outward MP shares 0.43 0.43
total inward MP shares 0.32 0.33
Bilateral MP = gross value of production for a liates from country i in l; Total Outward MP = total
gross value of production for foreign a liates from country i; Total Inward MP = total gross value of
production for foreign a liates in country l.
Table 4: Model’s Goodness of Fit.
Gravity estimates of  . We can explore the bias of estimates of the parameter   from gravity
equations using our simulated data with   =0 .5. We showed in section 2.4 that, in general,
the parameter   is not the elasticity of trade ﬂows to trade costs and cannot be recovered from
running a gravity equation for trade. This is due to the existence of intra-ﬁrm trade (a>0)
and the fact that   might be di erent from zero. We use our simulated data to estimate   from







   
.
Using non-linear least square,     =8 .21 (s.e. 0.02), very close to the Eaton and Kortum’s
estimate of 8.28 but signiﬁcantly di erent from the true value of   of 7.2. The upward bias in
    arises because   > 0 and implies that MP is trade-substitute. This leads to an additional
channel (beside the standard one associated with   in trade-only models) through which higher
trade costs decrease trade ﬂows, i.e. MP replaces trade. As expected, when we use the calibrated
data with   = 0,     =7 .01 (s.e. 0.01), much closer to the true value of  .
example, one could have country speciﬁc e ects determining inward MP costs. Smaller inward MP costs for the
large countries, for example, would allow the model to better match the observed inward MP ﬂows as shares of
GDP. We have refrained from pursuing this to keep the calibration as simple as possible.
264 Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Pro-
duction
4.1 Gains in Trade-Only and MP-Only Models
We ﬁrst compute the gains from trade and MP in trade-only and MP-only models, denoted by
GT  
n and GMP  
n, respectively. As shown in Lemma 3, these gains can be computed directly
using the data on bilateral trade and MP shares, and the calibrated values for   =7 .2 and
  =0 .5.34 As shown in Proposition 1, if we impose a =   = 0 then the gains from trade in our
model are equal to the gains from trade computed in a trade-only model (i.e., GTn = GT  
n).
Moreover, the gains from openness in our model would then be GO 
n   GT  
n · GMP  
n. Table 5
shows these gains calculated directly from the data.
The gains from openness tend to be more than twice as large as the gains from trade. For
Canada, Germany and the United States, for example, GO 
n is at least three times larger than
GT  
n. The gains from MP are higher than the gains from trade for almost all countries because
MP ﬂows tend to be larger than trade ﬂows (in the data). When we restrict our attention to
the intermediate goods sector, the gains from MP are generally smaller than the gains from
trade.
4.2 Gains in the calibrated model
The calculations under independence shown above miss the potential gains coming from the
interactions between trade and MP. We explore the e ect of such interactions in this section
by computing the di erent gains in the calibrated version of our model. Table 6 shows the
calculated gains from openness, trade, and MP, averaged across the nineteen OECD countries
in our sample, for the calibrated version of the model with   =0 .5 and   = 0.
The variables GT  
n and GMP  
n are calculated as indicated in Lemma 3, but using trade
and MP shares implied by the calibrated model. Using the simulated as opposed to the actual
data delivers almost the same average results because the model matches fairly accurately the
average bilateral trade and MP shares. But, at the country level, using the simulated or the
actual data does make a di erence because our calibrated model does not perfectly match the
34For GT 
n, we calculate Xnn/( wnYn) from the bilateral trade data we described above as 1    
i =n Xni/( wnYn). We use analogous procedure for MP. (See table 12 in the appendix) But, calculating
GMP 
fn from the data requires the amount of MP done in ﬁnal goods. We assume that the share of MP in the
intermediate good sector in each country is 0.48 as the one observed for the US.
27GO 
n GT  
n GMP  
n GMP  




New Zealand 1.06 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.02 0.6
Finland 1.07 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.02 0.8
Norway 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.01 0.9
Denmark 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.0
Portugal 1.14 1.04 1.09 1.05 1.04 1.1
Greece 1.04 1.03 1.01 1.004 1.005 1.1
Austria 1.10 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.3
Sweden 1.06 1.01 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.4
Belgium 1.23 1.14 1.08 1.04 1.04 1.5
Netherlands 1.18 1.09 1.09 1.05 1.04 2.3
Australia 1.06 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.02 2.9
Spain 1.07 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.02 4.1
Canada 1.12 1.04 1.08 1.04 1.04 4.2
Great Britain 1.10 1.04 1.06 1.03 1.03 6.8
France 1.06 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.02 7.0
Italy 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 7.2
Germany 1.07 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.02 9.4
Japan 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.004 1.004 15
United States 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.01 32
Average 1.08 1.035 1.045 1.022 1.021 5.3
Countries are sorted by (simulated) size.
Table 5: Gains from trade and MP according to trade-only and MP-only models.
28data.35 Meaningful comparisons between GTn with GT  
n, and between GMPn with GMP  
n,
must then be performed using the simulated data from the calibrated model. We show results
averaged across countries for   = 0 and   =0 .5 in Tables 6 and results by country for   =0 .5
in Table 7 (results by country for   = 0 are in Table 13 in the Appendix).
GOn GTn GT  
n GMPn GMP  
n
Average   =0 .5
All sectors 1.079 1.050 1.030 1.035 1.04
Intermediate good sector 1.056 1.050 1.030 1.013 1.019
Final good sector 1.021 - - 1.021 1.021
  =0
All sectors 1.066 1.041 1.029 1.038 1.039
Intermediate good sector 1.043 1.041 1.029 1.016 1.018
Final good sector 1.021 - - 1.021 1.021
Table 6: Gains from Openness, Trade, and MP. Calibrated Model.
The implied average gains from openness are around 7   8%. These gains are more than
twice as large as the average gains from openness coming from a trade-only model, GT  
n = 3%,
or an MP-only model, GMP  
n = 4%. On average, more than two thirds of the gains from
openness are from trade and MP in the intermediate goods sector (GOgn =4  6%), while the
remaining one third of the total gains are from MP in the ﬁnal goods sector (GOfn = 2%).
The calibrated model implies that trade is MP-complement since on average GTn > GT  
n.
Adding trade enhances MP by facilitating “intra-ﬁrm” trade and reducing the unit costs of
MP: the average unit cost for the multinational input bundle decreases by 50% with respect
to the scenario with only MP but not trade. For the group of the 6 smallest countries in our
sample (i.e., New Zealand, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Greece), the calibrated
model with   =0 .5 yields average gains from trade of 7% while the average GT  
n is 4%.
Turning to MP, the calibrated model implies that, on average, MP is trade-substitute since
GMPn =3 .5% < 4% = GMP  
n. As suggested by the analytical results under symmetry,
the complementarity forces associated with BMP are not strong enough to overcome the sub-
stitutability arising from the fact that MP adds a competing alternative to trade in serving
foreign markets. Still, the substitutability here is quite weak, and disappears as we consider
lower values of   —for   = 0 MP is practically trade-independent.
35Recall that we calibrated only 8 parameters determining the trade and MP costs as a function of bilateral
geographic and language variables.
29These results imply that while trade-only models tend to underestimate the gains from trade
by a signiﬁcant amount, MP-only models tend to overestimate the gains from MP by a small
amount. Another interesting result is that the gains from trade are much larger than the gains
from MP in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, once we have trade, adding the possibility of
doing MP in intermediates does not generate large gains, but when we have only MP, allowing
for trade generates signiﬁcant extra gains.36
Table 7 shows gains by country for the model calibrated with   =0 .5. Not surprisingly,
the gains from openness are larger for smaller countries: the correlation coe cient between Ln
and GOn is  0.65. For all countries, trade behaves as MP-complement, GTn > GT  
n, while MP
behaves as a mild trade-substitute, GMPn < GMP  
n. For a small country like Denmark, which
represents around 1% of OECD(19)’s size (measured by simulated L), the gains from openness
of around 12% more than double the gains calculated using trade-only models, GT  
n =4 .6%,
or MP-only models, GMP  
n =5 .6%. The gains from trade for Denmark are much higher than
those calculated with a trade-only model, GTn =7 .6% > 4.6% = GT  
n, while the gains from MP
are slightly lower than those calculated with a MP-only model, GMPn   5% < 5.6% = GMP  
n.
It is noteworthy that Japan and the United States, the two largest countries in our sample,
gain nothing from MP. In fact, if we restrict our attention to the gains from MP in the inter-
mediate good sector, then both Japan and the U.S. actually lose from MP (i.e., GMPgn < 1).
Intuitively, by doing outward MP these countries reallocate production from home to foreign
countries, in e ect sharing their superior technologies with the rest of the world and worsen-
ing their terms of trade (see Proposition 5). In principle, as explained in Section 2.6.3, there
are three forces that could counteract this negative e ect: ﬁrst, gains from inward MP, second,
gains from BMP, and third, increased demand for home production of inputs by foreign a liates
of multinational ﬁrms. In the calibrated model these forces are not strong enough and hence
the net e ect of MP can be negative. It is important to caution, however, that the calibrated
model fails to generate the high inward MP ﬂows observed in the data for the largest countries
in our sample (i.e., Japan and the U.S.). Hence, our measures of the gains from MP for these
countries are signiﬁcantly underestimated.37
36When we calibrate the model with trade and MP ﬁxing   =0 .9 (not shown), we still get that trade is
MP-complement, and MP is a mild trade-substitute.
37This can be easily seen by comparing GMP 
n calculated with the observed data (in table 5) and simulated
data (in table 7): while GMP 
US calculated from the data is 3%, the model’s calibration delivers 0.1%. See
Table 11 in the Appendix.
30GOn GTn GT  




New Zealand 1.10 1.06 1.02 1.07 1.08 1.037 0.6
Finland 1.09 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.007 0.8
Norway 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.014 0.9
Denmark 1.12 1.08 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.016 1.0
Portugal 1.15 1.08 1.03 1.08 1.09 1.033 1.1
Greece 1.13 1.07 1.03 1.08 1.09 1.033 1.1
Austria 1.15 1.09 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.022 1.3
Sweden 1.08 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.009 1.4
Belgium 1.16 1.10 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.016 1.5
Netherlands 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.012 2.3
Australia 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.005 2.9
Spain 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.010 4.1
Canada 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.021 4.2
Great Britain 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.009 6.8
France 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.002 7.0
Italy 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.008 7.2
Germany 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.005 1.008 1.001 9.4
Japan 1.003 1.002 1.002 1.000 1.001 1.000 14.5
United States 1.005 1.005 1.005 1.000 1.001 0.999 32.0
Average 1.079 1.050 1.030 1.035 1.041 1.01 5.26
Countries are sorted by (simulated) size.
Table 7: Gains from Openness, Trade, and MP, by country. Calibration with   =0 .5.
31Finally, it is interesting to explore how changes in trade and MP costs a ect a country’s
real income level. For this analysis we focus on New Zealand, a small and relatively isolated
country with average bilateral trade and MP costs that are higher than the average for our
sample: average inward trade (MP) costs are 2.32 (2.49) versus an average of 1.77 (1.91) in
our sample. We performed a simple experiment to quantify the e ect on New Zealand if its
bilateral inward and outward trade and MP costs became equal to those of Canada or Belgium,
two “centrally” located countries. We compute the percentage change in the real wage for New
Zealand of moving from the equilibrium in the calibrated model to one of three counterfactual
scenarios: (1) a situation with the trade costs equal to those of Canada or Belgium; (2) a
situation with the MP costs equal to those of Canada or Belgium; and (3) a situation with both
the trade and MP costs equal to those of Canada or Belgium.
New Zealand’s iceberg-type costs as in: Canada Belgium
% change in real wage
Trade 16% 14%
MP 38% 22%
Trade and MP 54% 35%
We use the calibrated version of the model with   =0 .5. Change in real wage for New Zealand of
moving from the calibrated level of trade and MP costs to: (1) a situation where trade costs are as
the ones calibrated for Canada (Belgium); (2) a situation where MP costs are as the ones calibrated
for Canada (Belgium); (3) a situation where both trade and MP costs are as the ones calibrated for
Canada (Belgium).
Table 8: Gains from Openness, Trade, and MP: the case of New Zealand.
The potential gains for New Zealand of having its bilateral trade and MP costs decline to the
levels prevailing in Canada or Belgium are large. Table 8 shows that if trade costs were changed
to the level of Canada, New Zealand’s real wage would increase by 16%, while doing the same
for MP costs would increase its real wage by 38%. The gains of simultaneously changing trade
and MP costs to Canadian levels would increase the real wage in New Zealand by 54%. These
gains for New Zealand would mainly come from having cheaper access to U.S. technologies
through MP in both tradable and non-tradable goods. Table 8 shows that New Zealand also
would experience signiﬁcant gains if its trade and MP costs declined to the levels prevailing in
Belgium, but not as much as if they declined to the levels prevailing in Canada. Overall, the
gains computed in this experiment are quite large compared to the gains from trade and MP
for New Zealand in 7. This result is consistent with Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) ﬁnding that
32the gains from trade relative to autarky are small relative to the gains of removing existing
trade costs towards a frictionless world.
5 Final Remarks
It seems reasonable to think that countries, specially small ones, beneﬁt greatly from their
interaction with the rest of the world. Whereas much attention has been devoted to trade as
the main channel for such beneﬁts, we argue in this paper for the need to broaden the scope
of the investigation to other channels. We have taken a step in this direction by developing
and calibrating a multi-country general-equilibrium Ricardian model of trade and MP. An
important consideration in building this model has been to allow for forces that make trade
and MP substitutes as well as forces that make them complements, as the empirical evidence
suggests. The calibration reveals that the gains from openness are much higher than the gains
from trade, and also higher than the gains from MP. On net, trade behaves as complement
for MP, while MP behaves as a mild substitute for trade. As a result, the gains from trade
calculated as the increase in real income from a situation with only MP to the (calibrated)
situation with trade and MP are more than twice as high as those calculated in models with
only trade, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). This is because
our model captures the indirect gains from trade associated with its role in facilitating MP.
Meanwhile, the gains from MP calculated with our model are just mildly lower than the ones
calculated in MP-only models.
We have focused on trade and MP as the only channels through which countries gain from
openness, but clearly they are not the only channels through which these gains are generated. In
particular, the direct di usion of ideas across countries could be as important as trade and MP.
For example, countries may beneﬁt from Japan’s superior technology in producing automobiles
by importing cars from Japan, by having Japanese ﬁrms produce cars domestically through
MP, or by the di usion of Japanese technologies to domestic ﬁrms. Evaluating the role of this
type of di usion in generating gains from openness is an important issue that we leave for future
research.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the assumption that research e orts in our framework are exogenous.
How would the results change if this assumption were relaxed? In the simplest version of
the model with only trade, as Eaton and Kortum (2001), trade does not a ect countries’
33research intensity (i.e., the share of the labor force devoted to research). The reason is that
although trade expands the market for ideas, it also increases competition, and these two e ects
exactly balance out. Thus, the gains from trade would not be a ected by having endogenous
research e orts. But, this result can change when we allow for MP because now countries
with a comparative advantage in innovation can specialize in research and use their superior
technologies for MP abroad. A comparative advantage in innovation would be reﬂected in higher
ratios of  n to Ln. Such countries would naturally have a trade deﬁcit that would be paid for by
the repatriation of proﬁts made abroad through MP. This is related to the explanations for the
imbalance in the U.S. external accounts in Hausmann and Sturtzeneger (2006) and McGrattan
and Prescott (2009). Again, this is an important topic that we leave for future research.
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38A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider ﬁrst the case of intermediate goods and let pgni   minl cglidnl/zgli.
The probability that pgni is lower than p is
Ggni(p) = 1   Pr(zgli   cglidnl/p for all l),
that under the assumption that zgli are draws from the multivariate Fr` echet in equation (5) is
given by
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Since Ggni(p) is independent across i, then the reasoning in Eaton and Kortum (2002) can
be immediately applied to show that country n will buy goods produced with country i’s
technologies for a measure of goods equal to  gni =  gni/
 
j  gnj. The corresponding result
for ﬁnal goods is derived simply by letting dnl   for n  = l.
Of the goods purchased by country n that are produced with country i technologies, what
is the share of these goods that are produced in country l? This is equal to the probability
that, for a speciﬁc good, country l is the cheapest location for i to produce for n with its
technology. This is equivalent to cglidnl/zgli   cgjidnj/zgji, or zgji   zgli(cgjidnj)/(cglidnl) for all
j  = l. Without loss of generality, assume that l = 1. The probability that zgji   ani,jzg1i for
all j  = 1 where ani,j   (cgjidnj)/(cg1idn1) is given by
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This implies that
















and hence, of the goods that country n buys that are produced with country i technologies, the
share that are produced in country l is  ni,l.
39The previous results relate to shares of goods while we are interested in expenditure shares.
Just as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), however, the price distribution of the goods that country
n buys is independent of the production location and is also independent of the origin of
the technology with which the good is produced. This implies that all the adjustment is
on the “extensive margin” and that the share of goods that country n buys from country l
that are produced with country i technologies is also the share of the total expenditure by
country n that is allocated to those goods. To see this, focus on intermediate goods and
condition on market n and technologies from country i. The probability that pgni   p and that
l is the least cost production location to reach n is the probability that dnlcgli/zgli   p and
dnjcgji/zgji   dnlcgli/zgli for all j, or zgli   dnlcgli/p and zgji   zgli(dnjcgji)/(dnlcgli) for all j.
Without loss of generality, assume that l = 1 and again let ani,j   (dnjcgji)/(dn1cg1i). We want
to compute
   
dn1cg1i/p F1(z,ani,2z,...,ani,Iz)dz. But simple math establishes that
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The distribution of prices in market n conditional on the good on the good produced in 1 with
technology i, we need to divide by  ni,1 gni. This yields a probability equal to





Since this does not depend on 1, it implies that for market n and conditioning on country i
technologies, the distribution of p that actually are produced in l is the same for l =1 ,2,...,I.
But independence across i allows us to apply the results from Eaton and Kortum (2002) to
establish that the distribution of prices for goods that n actually buys from i is Ggn(p)=
1 exp
 
  gnp  
for all i. This implies that the average price of goods is the same irrespective
of where they are produced and irrespective of the origin of the technology. The proof for ﬁnal
goods follows immediately from independence across i’s. 
Proof of Lemma 2. First note that PnQn is the total cost of the intermediate goods used
in production in country n. We ﬁrst calculate the total cost of the intermediate goods produced
in country n. This is wnLgn + PgnQgn, plus the intra-ﬁrm imports of foreign multinationals
located in n,
 
i =n  niYgni, minus the exports of the domestic input bundle for intermediates
to country n s subsidiaries abroad,
 
i =n  inYgin. Hence, the total cost of intermediate goods
produced in country n is
wnLgn + PgnQgn +
 
i =n




40In equilibrium, this must be equal to the value of intermediate goods produced in country n.
Hence,
wnLgn + PgnQgn +
 
i =n




























 gni gni,nPgnQn +
 
j =n
(Xjn    jnYgjn).
Substituting into equation (28) and simplifying we get










Using the trade balance condition in equation (9) to substitute
 
i =n Xin for
 
i =n Xni, using
equation (8), and simplifying, yields

















i  gnj,i = 1, hence,























Plugging equation (31) into (29), we get
 
 
1    
 
PgnQgn + PgnQgn = PgnQn,
from which it is straightforward that Qgn = (1    )Qn, and combined it with Qfn+Qgn = Qn,
we have
Qfn =  Qn. (32)
41Plugging Qgn = (1    )Qn back into equation (29), we get
wnLgn =  PgnQn,
and using Lgn + Lfn = Ln, we have
wn(Ln   Lfn)= PgnQn. (33)




1    
 
 PgnQn.





(Ln   Lfn), and hence Lfn =  Ln. Plugging
into equation (33), we ﬁnally get (1    )wnLn =  PgnQn, or PgnQn =  wnLn. 
Proof of Lemma 3. A trade-only model is obtained from our model with hfli,h gli   
for all l  = i. In this case it is easy to show from Lemma 1 that trade ﬂows satisfy the Eaton






   wnLn.
But Lemma 1 implies that
 
k Tkk (cgkdnk)
   =   
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  1/  
. (35)
Lemma 1 implies that Pfn =  fT
 1/ 






implies that wn/Pfn =(  fA)
 1 T
1/ 







   / 
,
where       ( fA)
 1 ( gB)
  . This establishes the result for the real wage in the closed economy
in equation (3) and it also shows that the gains from trade in a trade-only economy are given
by equation (14).
42A similar procedure leads to the formula for the gains from MP in an MP-only model,
which obtains from our model in the limit as a = 0 and dnl   for all n  = l. In particu-
lar, Lemma 1 implies that Ygli = Tli( gcglhgli/Pgl)   wlLl. Together with equation (34) and
 
k Tki(cgkhki)
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gP
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. (37)



















  1/   
Ygnn
 wnLn
   / 
. (38)

























Plugging equation (39) into (38), we ﬁnally get
wn
Pfn






  1/   
Ygnn
 wnLn
   / 
.
This immediately establishes the rest of the results of Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 1. From equation (7) and the results of Lemma 1, we have















   
 wnLn.






   
 wnLn,
Ygll =  
  
g (cgl/Pgl)
   Tll gl. (40)
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(Ygll/ gl)
 1/  . (41)





fni, from equation (6) and cfn = Aw 
nP 1  




  1/  Aw 
nP 1  
gn .
This implies that wn/Pfn =(  fA) 1T
 1/ 
fn (wn/Pgn)
1   . Using equation (41), we then get
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(Ygnn/ gn)
  / . (42)
But from equation (11) we can write  gl = [( wlLl)/Xll]
 






Plugging into equation (42), the real wage is then
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. (47)
This result immediately implies that
GOn  
wn/Pfn























44(Note that the limit hgli,h fli,d nl   is taken for all l  = i and n  = l -the same applies for all
limits below).
We can also use the result on real wages to compute the gains from trade:
GTn  
wn/Pfn










Proof of Lemma 4. First, it is easy to show that GMPfn = GMP  
fn for   = a = 0. Given
that neither trade ﬂows nor MP ﬂows in intermediate goods depend on MP in ﬁnal goods we
immediately get, using the results from Proposition 1, that
GMPfn  
wn/Pfn




















   / 
together
with the way in which Xnn/ wnLn changes as we take hgli    . Let   Xnn/ wnLn be the
domestic demand share for the counterfactual equilibrium with hgli    . Then
GMPgn  
wn/Pfn





   /   
Xnn/ wnLn
  Xnn/ wnLn
   / 
.
Since the second term on the RHS is in general not equal to one, this implies that GMPgn  =
GMP  
gn, and hence GMPn  = GMP  
n.38  
Characterization of Symmetric Equilibrium
Under symmetry, we can derive explicit expressions for trade and MP shares as well as for
the real wage. Using the results of Lemma 1, MP in ﬁnal goods from any other country as a
share of a country’s total income is given by





1+( I   1)h  ,





1+( I   1)h  . (48)
38Note that if we consider the limit hgli   but compute the trade ﬂows with Tll = T 
gl then the domestic
demand share is the same as the one that prevails in the actual equilibrium, Xnn/ wnLn.
45Turning to MP in intermediate goods, we have
  Yg  
Ygni
 wnLn
=   Yg1 +   YgB,0 +   YgB,1,
for i  = n. The term   Yg1 captures MP for goods destined to stay in the domestic market,   YgB,0 is
MP for goods that go back to the country where the technology originates, and   YgB,1 is MP for
goods that go to a third market. Both   YgB,0 and   YgB,1 take place through BMP. The respective
formulas are
  Yg1 =
 
  /(1  )
1 m  /(1  )
 0 +( I   1) 1
,   YgB,0 =
 
  /(1  )
0 (md)  /(1  )
 0 +( I   1) 1
,   YgB,1 =
(I   2) 
  /(1  )
1 (md)  /(1  )







  /(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
  /(1  )
1 d  /(1  )
 0 +( I   1) 1
. (49)
The equilibrium trade share is given by:
  X   Xnl/ wnLn =   X0,B +   X1 +   X1,B +    Yg,
for l  = n. The term   X0,B captures the imports of goods produced abroad (in l) with the
importer’s (country n) own technologies through BMP; the term   X1 is the standard component
associated with imports from a country that used that country’s technology for production
(country l uses its technologies to export to n); the term   X1,B captures imports of goods
produced with country l technologies in countries other than l (BMP); and the term    Yg
captures imports of the input bundle from l for domestic operations of country l multinationals.
The formulas for   X0,B and   X1,B are the same as the formulas for   YgB,0 and   YgB,1, respectively,





  /(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
  /(1  )
1 m  /(1  )
 0 +( I   1) 1
. (50)
It is easy to see from these results that the total value of BMP as a share of total MP is
BMP =
  YgB,0 +   YgB,1
  Yf +   Yg
.
Consider the limit as     1, so that technology draws are the same across production locations.
In this case, BMP   0. Further, when h>d ,   Yg   0 and there is only trade,   X =
46d  /(1 + (I   1)d  ). On the contrary, when h < d, trade is just associated with MP ﬂows,
  X =  m  /(1 + (I   1)m  )=   Yg.
Proof of Proposition 2. We want to compute GO, GT, and GMP under symmetry. We
start by computing the real wage when there is trade and MP, and under isolation. We know
that wi = w, for all i, and that the price index for intermediate goods collapses to
Pg =   
 1/ 
g =(  B)
1/  · [ 0 +( I   1) 1]
 1/   · T
 1/   · w.
The price index for ﬁnal goods is
Pf =   
 1/  =  
 
1+( I   1)h
    1/ 
· T




Using the result for Pg above, the real wage is
w
Pf
=    
 1  
1+( I   1)h
   1/ 
· [ 0 +( I   1) 1]
 /  T
(1+ )/ , (51)
where       ( A)( B)
 . The real wage under isolation is obtained by letting d   and h   
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1+( I   1)h
   1/ 
[ 0 +( I   1) 1]
 /  .
To calculate GT, we need to calculate the real wage when there is only MP. By letting d   





=    
 1 ·
 
1+( I   1)h
   1/ 
·
 
1+( I   1)  m
    / 
· T
(1+ )/ ,
where  m   limd   m = (1   a)
1






 0 +( I   1) 1
1+( I   1)  m  
  / 
.





=    
 1 ·
 
1+( I   1)d









1+( I   1)h
   1/ 
 
 0 +( I   1) 1
1+( I   1)d  
  / 
.
It is easy to check that the ﬁrst term on the RHS is GMPf while the second term is GMPg. 
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 2, Lemma 3, and equation (50) we have
GT =
 
1+( I   1)  m  
 0 +( I   1) 1







  /(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
  /(1  )
1 m  /(1  )
 0 +( I   1) 1
   / 
.
Denote B     
  /(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
  /(1  )
1 m  /(1  ), and B    1+( I   1)  m  .
(a) For   = 0, B  = 1 + (I   1)m  . But a>0 implies   m > m and hence   m   <m   ,
so 1 + (I   1)  m   < 1 + (I   1)m  , and B  >B  , then GT > GT   and trade is MP-
complement. For   > 0 and a = 0, the sign of B    B is the same as the sign of BB  
 
  /(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
  /(1  )
1 m  /(1  )   1   (I   1)m  . But,
BB =
 
1+( I   1)(md)





  /(1  ) + 1 + (I   2)d




This is negative if   > 0.
(b) For a>0, lim  1   m    . Thus lim  1 GT = GOg. Thus, for trade to be MP-
complement when     1, we need to show that GOg > GT  . But this is equivalent to
G    
  /(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
  /(1  )
1 m  /(1  ) > 1. Using the deﬁnitions for  0 and  1, we have
G =
 
1+( I   1)(md)
  /(1  )   
+( I   1)
 
d
  /(1  )m
 /(1  ) + 1 + (I   2)d
  /(1  )   
m
  .
For   = 0, G = 1 + (I   1)m   > 1, so GOg > GT  . For 0 <   < 1 and d = 1, G =
 
1+( I   1)m  /(1  ) 1   > 1. Since G is increasing in d, it follows that G>1 for all d.
Now consider again the case with a>0 and let      . We want to show that if h < d then
trade is MP-substitute, or GT < GT  . We have lim      m = h and lim    m = min[h,d]=h.
Then GT < GT   in the limit when     is equivalent to
1+(I 1)h
   >
 
1+( I   1)(hd)
  /(1  )   
+(I 1)h
  /(1  )  
d
  /(1  ) + h
  /(1  ) +( I   2)(hd)
  /(1  )   
.
The ﬁrst term on the RHS of this inequality is smaller than one, so it is su cient to show that
h
   >h
  /(1  )  
d
  /(1  ) + h
  /(1  ) +( I   2)(hd)
  /(1  )   
.
48If d   then the RHS is h  . Since the RHS is decreasing in d, then it must be lower than
h   for any ﬁnite d. 
Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 2, Lemma 3, and equation (49), we have
GMPg =
 
1+( I   1)d  
 0 +( I   1) 1








1 1/(1  )
0 +( I   1) 
1 1/(1  )
1 d  /(1  )
 0 +( I   1) 1
   / 
.
It is obvious that GMP  
g = GMPg for   = 0. We want to show that GMP  
g > GMPg for
0 <  < 1. But GMP  
g > GMPg is equivalent to
1+(I 1)d
   >
 
1+( I   1)(md)




  /(1  ) +( I   2)m
  /(1  )
   
d
  .
This is clearly true for 0 <  < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Lemma 1 implies that under frictionless trade we have a share
 S =
 S
 N+ S of expenditure on intermediate goods in each country goes to goods produced with
South technologies, where
 N   TN
 
c
  /(1  )
gN +( hcgS)
  /(1  )
 1  
,
 S   TS
 
(hcgN)
  /(1  ) + c
  /(1  )
gS
 1  
.
On the other hand, a share  SS ( SN) of intermediates produced with South (North) technolo-
gies are produced in the South, where
 SS =
c
  /(1  )
gS
(hcgN)
  /(1  ) + c





  /(1  )
c
  /(1  )
gN +( hcgS)
  /(1  ).
Trade balance condition then implies
( S SS +  N SN) wNLN = (1    S SS    N SN) wSLS.
No MP (h    ) implies  SN = 0,  N = TNc
  
gN and  S = TSc
  
gS, so the trade balance condition
implies (just as in Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
wN/wS =  
1/(1+  ),
49where    
TN/LN






1/   
TN + TS 
   / 
.
where       /(1+  ). As one would expect, this does not depend on   (since there is no MP).
Now consider the case with frictionless MP (hg = 1 -but still hf    ). The trade balance
condition now implies
wN/wS =     (LS/LN)
1/(1+  /(1  )),
while the ﬁnal goods price index in North is
PfN = T
 1/ 
N (TN + TS)
  /   
1+ 





(1 +    /(1  ))
 (1  ) / TN
1/  (TN + TS)
 / 













TN + TS 






This is equivalent to
f( )  
 
1+l
  /(1  +  ) (1  )
(  + l)   v   l 
    0,
where l   LS/LN. Note that
f(0) = l
   +  /l +1  ( /l)
  .
Since 0 <   < 1 then  /l +1> ( /l)
  for any  /l, so f(0) > 0. On the other hand,
lim
  1f( )= v   l 
  < 0.
Moreover, it is easy to show that f ( ) < 0 for    ]0,1[, implying that there is a     ]0,1[ such
that GMPN > 1 for   <    and GMPN < 1 for   >   . 
50B The Dynamic Model
Assume that an idea from country i has productivity qli in country l. Assume that the vector






   
1  




  /(1  )
li <    /(1  ) for     (0,1) and   > 1. Note that the marginal distribution of
qli     for any li is 1 (qli/ )  , so we can think of H(·) as a multivariate Pareto distribution.
Research is modeled as the creation of ideas, although for simplicity here we assume that
this is exogenous. In particular, we assume that there is an instantaneous (and constant) rate of
arrival 2  i of new ideas per person in country i. The parameter  i varies across countries and
captures di erences in “research” productivity across countries, while   is a common parameter
that will be normalized below. Ideas are speciﬁc to goods, and the good to which an idea
applies can be an intermediate good or a ﬁnal good with equal probability. If the idea applies
to an intermediate (ﬁnal) good the identity of the good is drawn from a uniform distribution
in v   [0,1] (u   [0,1]). This implies that at time t there is a probability   iLi(t) of drawing
an idea for any particular (intermediate or ﬁnal) good. The arrival of ideas is then a Poisson
process with rate function   iLi(t), so the number of ideas that have arrived for a particular
good by time t is distributed Poisson with rate   i(t), where  i(t)  
  t
0  iLi(t)ds. (From here
onwards, we suppress the time index.)
The technology frontier for country i is the upper envelope of all the vectors qi. That is,
letting  li denote the set of all qli associated with ideas existing in country i at a certain point
in time, then the technology frontier for country i is zi   (max{q1i    1i},...,max{qIi    Ii}).
This is distributed according to
Fi(zi) = Pr(Z1i   z1i,...,ZIi   zIi)=
   
k=0





   i






   i(1 H(zi))
= exp
 






   
1  
li





  /(1  )
li <    /(1  ). Letting Tli    i, setting     = 1, and taking the limit as      0,
51then we get the multivariate Fr´ echet distribution in (5).
Assuming that Li(t) grows at the constant rate gL (that we assume common across coun-
tries), in steady state  i(t)= iLi(t)/gL, so  i(t) and hence Tli(t) grow at rate gL for all l,i.
This implies that the static equilibrium described in section 2.3 is replicated at all dates, and
that the real wage in all countries is increasing at rate g = 1
 (1 +  )gL.
52C Data
The UNCTAD measure of MP includes both local sales in n and exports to any other country,
including the home country i. The number of observations drops to 219 country-pairs for which
we have available data. For a detailed description of the UNCTAD MP data see Ramondo
(2008).
Total expenditure on intermediate goods in the model is  wnLn, while in the data we
compute a measure of total expenditures on manufacturing from all the countries in our sample.
This measure is computed as gross production in manufacturing in country n, plus total imports
of manufacturing goods into country n from the remaining countries in the sample, minus total
manufacturing exports from country n to the rest of the world. Data on these three variables
for each country are from the STAN database (an average over the period 1990-2002). Total
expenditure on ﬁnal goods in the model is wnLn while in the data we use GDP for country n
plus total imports into country n from the remaining eighteen OECD countries in the sample,
minus total exports from country n to the rest of the world. Data on GDP is from the World
Development Indicators, in current dollars, and total exports and imports are from Feenstra
and Lipsey (2005).
We use intra-ﬁrm imports by multinationals’ foreign a liates from their home country as
the empirical counterpart for imports of the national input bundle from the home country for
MP, normalized by gross production of a liates from i in n,  niYgni/(Ygni + Yfni).We combine
data on intra-ﬁrm exports from U.S. parent companies to their a liates abroad with data on
imports done by foreign a liates located in U.S. from their parent ﬁrms, an average over the
period 1990-2003.
For the empirical counterpart of the bilateral share of MP in intermediate goods,Ygni/(Ygni + Yfni),
we use data on gross production of a liates from country i in n in the manufacturing sector
as share of total gross production for a liates of multinational ﬁrms from i in n. The relevant
data on bilateral MP in manufacturing is also for i = U.S. or n = U.S., an average over the
period 1999-2003.
We are able to compute BMP when the U.S. is the source or the destination country, again
as an average over the period 1999-2003. The BEA divides total sales of American a liates
produced in country l into sales to the local market, to the US, and to third foreign markets.
This is the empirical counterpart for
 
n =l  gni gni,lXgn/(Ygli +Yfli), from i = US in a country
53l belonging to the OECD(19). We average out across l’s, and obtain an average bilateral BMP
share for the US a liates in the OECD(19). A similar procedure yields the average bilateral
BMP share for US a liates of foreign multinationals.
Bilateral distance is the distance in kilometers between the largest cities in the two countries.
Common language is a dummy equal to one if both countries have the same o cial language
or more than 20% of the population share the same language (even if it is not the o cial one).
Common border is equal to one if two countries share a border.
D Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Observations
Distance (in km) 6,006 6,099 342
Common Language 0.11 0.31 342
Common Border 0.09 0.28 342
bilateral trade share 0.019 0.035 342
bilateral MP share 0.022 0.043 219
bilateral intra-ﬁrm share† 0.074 0.072 34
bilateral MP share in manufacturing† 0.48 .13 33
†: from/to the United States.
Table 9: Summary Statistics. Data.
54R&D employment Real GDP pw Ln  n
(% of total employment) (as share of U.S.) (as share of U.S.) (as share of U.S.)
data data model model
Australia 0.68 0.80 0.09 0.07
Austria 0.49 0.80 0.04 0.02
Belgium 0.67 0.89 0.05 0.04
Canada 0.62 0.80 0.13 0.10
Denmark 0.61 0.77 0.03 0.02
Spain 0.36 0.70 0.13 0.05
Finland 1.22 0.71 0.03 0.04
France 0.62 0.79 0.22 0.16
Great Britain 0.53 0.70 0.21 0.13
Germany 0.60 0.75 0.29 0.21
Greece 0.28 0.56 0.04 0.01
Italy 0.29 0.88 0.23 0.08
Japan 0.95 0.65 0.45 0.51
Netherlands 0.51 0.82 0.07 0.04
Norway 0.77 0.84 0.03 0.02
New Zealand 0.45 0.64 0.02 0.01
Portugal 0.29 0.53 0.03 0.01
Sweden 0.83 0.71 0.04 0.04
United States 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00
Average 0.61 0.75 0.16 0.14
Table 10: Data and Model’s Variables.
E Gains from Openness: Calibration with   =0
55as % of GDP Exports Imports MP out MP in Exports† MP out MP in
Data Model’s calibration (  =0 .5)
Australia 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.04 0.03 0.08
Austria 0.18 0.24 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.45
Belgium 0.45 0.48 0.22 0.46 0.32 0.24 0.42
Canada 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.45 0.20 0.09 0.35
Denmark 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.11 0.34
Spain 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.06 0.18
Finland 0.22 0.16 0.48 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22
France 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.08
Great Britain 0.12 0.15 0.32 0.34 0.12 0.10 0.16
Germany 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.06
Greece 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.48
Italy 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.13
Japan 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.005
Netherlands 0.32 0.27 1.00 0.50 0.20 0.11 0.24
Norway 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.31
New Zealand 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.25 0.10 0.03 0.47
Portugal 0.18 0.26 0.04 0.51 0.19 0.05 0.51
Sweden 0.23 0.19 0.36 0.32 0.21 0.15 0.21
United States 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.01
Average 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.10 0.25
†: in the model, total exports = total imports by country. MP out is total gross value of production
for foreign a liates from country i; MP in is total gross value of production for foreign a liates in
country l.
Table 11: Trade and MP shares. Data and Model.
56Domestic Trade shares Domestic MP shares
data model   =0 .5 model   = 0 data model   =0 .5 model   =0
Australia 0.80 0.92 0.94 0.71 0.92 0.94
Austria 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.74 0.55 0.53
Belgium 0.16 0.37 0.36 0.54 0.58 0.53
Canada 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.65 0.65
Denmark 0.85 0.52 0.51 0.88 0.66 0.66
Spain 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.82 0.85
Finland 0.66 0.51 0.54 0.76 0.78 0.77
France 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.80 0.92 0.93
Great Britain 0.55 0.75 0.79 0.66 0.84 0.85
Germany 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.94 0.95
Greece 0.63 0.68 0.63 0.94 0.52 0.56
Italy 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.90
Japan 0.72 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.995 0.995
Netherlands 0.31 0.59 0.61 0.50 0.76 0.78
Norway 0.90 0.53 0.53 0.83 0.69 0.69
New Zealand 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.75 0.53 0.55
Portugal 0.55 0.63 0.57 0.49 0.49 0.52
Sweden 0.92 0.59 0.62 0.68 0.79 0.79
United States 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.82 0.99 0.99
Average 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.75 0.76
Trade domestic shares are for manufacturing. MP domestic shares are for all sectors. Domestic
shares are normalized by country’s total mfg. expenditure (gross value of production in mfg. minus
total mfg. exports plus mfg. imports from the countries in the sample). MP shares are normalized
by country’s GDP.
Table 12: Domestic Trade and MP shares. Data and Model.
57GOn GTn GT  




New Zealand 1.088 1.038 1.017 1.073 1.077 1.0275 0.6
Finland 1.078 1.056 1.044 1.036 1.036 1.0168 0.8
Norway 1.091 1.060 1.045 1.048 1.051 1.0212 0.9
Denmark 1.099 1.064 1.048 1.053 1.056 1.0228 1.0
Portugal 1.119 1.065 1.040 1.080 1.086 1.0318 1.1
Greece 1.104 1.055 1.033 1.072 1.077 1.0288 1.1
Austria 1.135 1.082 1.059 1.077 1.084 1.0319 1.3
Sweden 1.063 1.045 1.034 1.031 1.032 1.0144 1.4
Belgium 1.147 1.096 1.074 1.076 1.082 1.0325 1.5
Netherlands 1.067 1.046 1.035 1.034 1.034 1.0153 2.4
Australia 1.013 1.007 1.004 1.009 1.009 1.0038 2.9
Spain 1.040 1.027 1.020 1.021 1.022 1.0097 4.1
Canada 1.087 1.053 1.035 1.053 1.057 1.0225 4.2
Great Britain 1.037 1.023 1.016 1.021 1.022 1.0095 6.8
France 1.030 1.024 1.020 1.011 1.010 1.0057 7.0
Italy 1.028 1.019 1.014 1.015 1.015 1.0068 7.3
Germany 1.023 1.019 1.016 1.008 1.007 1.0045 9.4
Japan 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.001 1.001 1.0004 14.4
United States 1.005 1.004 1.004 1.002 1.001 1.001 31.8
Average 1.066 1.041 1.029 1.038 1.040 1.016 5.3
Countries are sorted by (simulated) size.
Table 13: Gains from Openness, Trade, and MP. Calibration with   =0 .
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